Water lot of opportunities!

This blog has given me the chance to explore how environmental change is affecting water and development across Africa. Predictions for environmental changes expect Africa’s hydrology to take a pretty big hit over the next few decades. This will add yet another obstacle to Africa’s continuous struggle to achieve the development it desires.

It’s easy to paint a negative picture of the situation:

Already, water supplies are declining near mountainous regions due to loss of the forest cover that intercepts cloud moisture, and glaciers are expected to disappear completely. The use of hydroelectric power – currently driving many SSA countries and their economies – is under threat due to falling river levels. Agricultural yields in SSA are diminishing due to ever-increasingly unpredictable weather patterns, particularly for small-scale farmers. In urban areas, more frequent and intense floods are damaging the already inadequate sanitation systems and polluting drinking-water infrastructure, advancing the spread of disease and further decreasing living standards for slum dwellers. Conflicts over water supplies are expected to increase on both a transboundary and regional scale.

But as the saying goes, ‘while the challenges are great, so are the opportunities’. This is where human intervention comes into play. Such interventions will be required on all scales – within local communities, regional governments, national governments, and across international bodies.

Governments can invest in reforestation programmes. Energy generation can be diversified. Water management can be more efficient. Urban sanitation infrastructure can be developed. Negotiations and agreements can be instituted to avoid water wars.

Farming methods can be completely transformed: the use of farming inputs can increase crop yields, more resilient crops can be introduced, and new water harvesting techniques can be implemented. And this year’s COP22 is just one example of how effective international cooperation can be by focusing discussions on Africa’s agriculture and water issues.

As I have highlighted previously, good governance and political stability is essential to achieve any of these ambitions. Many of these solutions also require access to capital, but this can be acquired through funding from NGOs, social enterprises, and payments from developed nations who owe heavy reparations for the climate change they have created.

I am confident that with the appropriate adaptations and international support, rather than us facing climate changes in Africa with trepidation, we will be watching Africa’s bright future unfold.

Localised water wars?

Whilst potential conflicts on an international scale can often be avoided through diplomatic negotiations and agreements, this is not the case for regional water wars, particularly in countries with already existing social, political or economic instability (Engelke and Sticklor 2015).

Regional conflicts often erupt between pastoralists and farmers; drought is depleting grazing areas for nomadic herders and so pastoralists are increasingly invading farmland (Taylor 2011). Such disputes occur in low-income nations where survival is dependent on water access, and the desperation of the situation means that the clashes flare up rapidly (Ashton 2002). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon branded the conflict in Darfur the world’s first climate change conflict, stating that harsher droughts had kick-started war between farmers and pastoralists in the region (Notaras 2009).

Water shortages due to environmental change can trigger migration to regions with larger water supplies. Environmental migration can create conflict with the receiving population by increasing the strain on resources, especially in cases where there is tension between different ethnic communities (Reuveny 2007).

One region experiencing environmental migration is between the Omo River in Ethiopia and Lake Turkana in Kenya. There are 24 tribes reliant on the Omo River and the downstream Lake Turkana for their water supply. However, the Horn of Africa has experienced recurrent drought for the past 40 years, and the drought cycle has intensified from once every eight years to once every two to three years (Adano and Daudi 2012). Less rainfall, alongside the diversion of water for irrigation and dam projects, has caused the river to retreat. Lake Turkana receives 90% of its water from the Omo River, but a combination of rising temperatures and less rainfall has caused the lake to recede into Kenya. In the past, the tribes have used indigenous knowledge to adapt their agricultural practices and water usage to droughts, but the communities no longer understand the patterns of the seasons with the increasing frequency of drought conditions, and are struggling to adapt accordingly. Therefore in times of scarcity the Ethiopian tribes have followed the water into Kenya, and inter-tribal encounters that have ensued have caused the increase of conflict; the Turkana tribe are notorious for their extreme violence, attacking and killing anyone they find trespassing (Yale Environment 360 2010).

Lake Turkana, Kenya (Source: EVWind)

Another case of regional violence took place in Nigeria in 2014 between Fulani herdsmen – the largest semi-nomadic group in the world – and Tiv/Agatu farmers over grazing areas and water access (Gleick 2015). Military intervention was required to quell the fighting, and the conflict resulted in over 1,200 deaths. Rising temperatures and drought in Nigeria are forcing the Fulani herdsmen to roam further south and so they are increasingly clashing with the farming communities that they encounter. Furthermore, ethnic tensions between the Muslim Fulani herdsmen and Christian agricultural communities intensify the conflict (Adams 2016). Such conflicts have had knock-on effects on Nigeria’s national development by discouraging foreign investment and thwarting trade (Mikailu 2016).

A Fulani herdsman, Nigeria (Source: BBC)

What potential solutions are there to preventing regional conflicts?

Once again, we come back to the importance of good governance. There is a close link between inadequate law enforcement of resource allocation, and the incidence of conflict, in countries with weak governance (Adano and Daudi 2012). Therefore, governments need to be more proactive in providing clear regulations for water resource use and enforcing them effectively (Balch 2014). Ideally, when creating these regulations, civil society stakeholders should be involved in the decision-making process, as local society groups often have a better understanding of the facts on the ground than politicians. When communities feel that they have been given a voice, it’s more likely that peaceful negotiations can take place between societal groups. Additionally, stakeholder participation creates a sense of ownership over the outcomes, making the policies easier to enforce (Adano and Daudi 2012).

In situations when the actions of national governments alone are not good enough, international intervention is required, whether through negotiations or the provision of aid to communities lacking food. However it is important that the response is appropriate in serving the needs of the recipients. For example, in response to the case of the Omo River and Lake Turkana dispute, the international community sent food aid; surely this generous contribution would hugely benefit those suffering food shortages. But what food did they send? Maize, which requires water to cook: highly impractical for a community desperately lacking water.

Moreover, alongside a humanitarian response, a long-term development approach to tackle the problems of drought faced by local communities is essential to prevent conflict, such as through investment in drought-resilient crops or water-harvesting technologies (Yale Environment 360 2010).

Overall, to effectively and lastingly prevent regional disputes, local communities need to feel that they are being listened to and are provided with truly beneficial solutions.

Water wars?

Water has been nicknamed ‘blue gold’ and ‘oil of the 21^st century’ which emphasises its ever-increasing rarity and the growing recognition of its importance. However, unlike oil, water has no substitute, which makes it all the more valuable – particularly since its essential not only for day-to-day survival but for sustaining manufacturing and energy generation (Engelke and Sticklor 2015).

Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, stated in his Millennium Report that climate change ‘may increase social and political tensions in unpredictable but potentially dangerous ways’ (Annan 2000: 44). So far we have seen that many African regions face a future of increasing variability in rainfall patterns and prolonged droughts, and these climatic effects, combined with growing populations and a desire for development, create a situation of growing demand for a declining water supply. Therefore it seems inevitable that one way Annan’s warning will unfold is through conflicts over water resources across Africa: so-called ‘water wars’ (Gleick 1993). These conflicts can occur at different scales, such as localised regional clashes at the village level, intra-national disputes, and transboundary international disagreements (Gleick 1993); this blog post will specifically explore transboundary disputes.

Countries can be fiercely protective of their water supplies, particularly if they support industries that are sustaining the economy, and debates over water are often emotionally charged (Ashton 2002). Africa is considered particularly vulnerable to a rise in conflicts due to its unstable political history and past wars over ethnic tensions and natural resources (Adano and Daudi 2012). A legacy of African colonialism is that national borders were assigned arbitrarily, creating a situation where large water bodies are shared between a number of countries: 90% of Africa’s freshwater resources are found in rivers and lakes shared between at least two countries (Goulden et al. 2009). This results in frequent struggles over access to water supplies, and tensions are especially high when upstream river users exploit water resources without consideration for the downstream users (Ashton 2002).

One site of transboundary water tensions is the Nile, which flows through eight North African arid countries, and is predicted to have a reduced flow in the second half of the century due to less rainfall and higher evaporation rates (Beyene et al. 2010). It provides 97% of Egypt’s water supply, but upstream use of the Nile leaves Egypt in a vulnerable position. Egypt believes it has historic rights to the Nile and has tried to cement this through treaties in 1929 and 1959 that ensure it has access to 87% of the river flow as well as the power to reject proposed upstream projects. However, in 2010, other Nile Basin countries signed a deal allowing them to bypass Egypt’s approval (The Guardian 2015).

The Nile River Basin (Source: World Bank)

To put this defiance into practice, Ethiopia is currently constructing the Grand Renaissance dam across the Blue Nile, which has caused huge tensions with Egypt, as Egypt has claimed that the dam will severely lower the level of the Nile and reduce Egypt’s water supply by over 10bn kilolitres. In a fiery speech in 2013, the Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi vowed to ‘defend each drop of Nile water with our blood’ – a clearly violent discourse (Kingsley 2013).

Another example of a transboundary water conflict is the case of the Muene River, which spans Mozambique and Zimbabwe. A dumpsite adjacent to the Zimbabwean stretch of the river releases chemicals into the water body, and this has caused cholera outbreaks and the death of the fish population downstream at the Chicamba dam in Mozambique. Climate change has increased the persistence of drought in the region, and the ongoing drought has worsened the issue as lower river levels mean a higher concentration of pollutants in the available water. These issues are often left unresolved because there is an inefficient governance framework to effectively deal with the problem – if the issue is reported to the South African Development Community (SADC) secretariat, the most the SADC will do is recommend that the damaging activity should stop, but this is not enforced (Kings 2016).

Chicamba dam, Mozambique (Source: Hydrokast)

However, the notion of an increase in ‘water wars’ has been thought of by many as simplistic, because in reality countries agree to cooperate through agreements and treaties, rather than resorting to violence (Niasse 2005). There is also a risk that claims of climate conflicts promote ‘climate reductionism’ and relinquishes governments of their responsibility to prevent these problems (Kuo 2016).

So what role can governments play?

Transboundary water conflicts can be bypassed with greater cooperation between water users through the creation of frameworks and agreements, such as the 1991 Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which includes principles of ‘equitable utilisation’ and the ‘prevention of significant harm to other states’ to ensure that no country benefits at the expense of another user (Gleick 1993). In addition, collaboration between nations is beneficial, whether this is to explore techniques on how water can be managed more sustainably, or to share climatic and hydrological data to increase transparency (Niasse 2005).

Furthermore, political stability makes transboundary water wars less likely; you only need to look to the Danube basin in Europe to see how 19 countries have been able to peacefully share the water resource due to their stable democratic governments (Chang 2013). Of course, other factors play a role, such as having access to funding and knowledge for more advanced water management technologies which is limited in many African nations, but a stable government is a necessity.

Increased water stress does have the potential to trigger more international disputes – but it can also provide an opportunity for greater unity, by forcing countries to work together to achieve maximum benefits for all. This was the case with the Lake Chad Basin: issues over water management actually boosted cooperation between Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon (Adams 2016). The ultimate goal, as Ashton (2002) wrote so neatly, is for water management strategies to ‘be guided by the values of sustainability, equity, mutual cooperation, and the attainment of optimal benefit for society’. 

Urbanisation, sanitation and environmental change

Even with the adaptation techniques put in place to make agriculture more resilient to environmental changes (as discussed previously), crop failures have led to increased urbanisation across sub-Saharan Africa, with farmers seeking alternative employment opportunities; rural-urban migration accounted for half of Africa’s urban growth between the 1960s and 1990s (Barrios et al. 2006). Africa’s urban population reached almost 350 million in 2014 (Henderson et al. 2016), and SSA’s urban population is predicted to reach 760 million by 2030 (Ramin 2009).

However, when urban immigrants arrive at their destination, life doesn’t get much easier. 71.8% of the urban population of SSA live in slums which lack basic sanitation and drinking water supplies. In 2000, 30-50% of African urban dwellers didn’t have access to a safe water supply, and even those with access often couldn’t afford to take advantage of it (Ramin 2009). The already low-quality urban water and sanitation infrastructure is predicted to worsen with the combined pressures of urbanisation and climate change (Oates et al. 2014).

How does climate change affect urban water and sanitation infrastructure?

An increase in rainfall intensity due to climate change is predicted, which means more urban flooding, particularly in countries with tropical climates that already experience intense tropical rainstorms and flash floods. The nature of urban infrastructure exacerbates the impact of these rainfall events: roads and paved surfaces obstruct natural channels, and drains are unable to cope with the huge volumes of water. And since the urban poor are more likely to settle in unfavourable flood-prone areas of the city, they are most vulnerable to flood events (Douglas et al. 2008).

In the short term, flooding can damage drinking-water infrastructure, preventing access to water supplies for a few days, or even a few months (WHO 2009). Flooding also spreads diseases by causing the overflowing of sanitation systems such as pit latrines and septic tanks, causing the contamination of surface and groundwater supplies (Satterthwaite 2008).

In the long term, raised groundwater levels due to more frequent and intense precipitation events decrease the effectiveness of purification processes that occur naturally, and so this will reduce the removal of pathogens from water supplies and increase the risk of infectious water-borne diseases (WHO 2009).

Mozambique is one example of a country with a tropical climate. Heavy rains and cyclones in Mozambique in 2000 led to the worst flooding in 50 years, causing the wreckage of the capital city of Maputo, and the disruption of urban water and sanitation services. There was an outbreak of cholera and dysentery, and over 1 million people were affected (Douglas et al. 2008). In addition, the flooding of 3000 septic tanks in the cities of Chokwi and Xia-Xia in Mozambique caused widespread contamination (WHO 2009).

What can be done to increase the resilience of urban water and sanitation infrastructure to climate change?

As in every case, strong governance is essential (Oats et al. 2014). Governments tend to have a weaker role in low-income and some middle-income nations, and fail to serve the whole urban population. Many major cities in low-income African nations don’t have sewer systems or a private piped water supply, and a lack of sufficient waste collection services means that waste clogs up drains, so light rainfall is enough to create localised floods (Satterthwaite 2008).

Governments are often reluctant to extend urban integrated drainage systems to informal settlements, because doing so legitimises the slum areas, but this worsens the impacts of rainfall events. In Lagos, Nigeria, the Iwaya/Makoko slums in low-lying areas are experiencing more frequent flooding and peak flows are increasing. The drainage system is inadequate to cope with the water levels, and floodwaters often bring organic waste into homes.

Waste accumulation in Iwaya/Makoko (source: Nnaji 2016)

But the locals aren’t helping themselves: waste that is dumped in the lagoon by residents blocks drains. Therefore the flooding problem would be solved by a joint effort of governments introducing proper drainage facilities, and local residents regularly clearing the drainage channels (Douglas et al. 2008).

The inseparable link between water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and climate change is often overlooked. For example, shouldn’t the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change be working together with the Sustainable Development Goals to formulate appropriate policies? There needs to be better integration of climate change and WASH bodies on all scales to bring about the most beneficial WASH and climate adaptation plans (Whiting 2016).

A ‘development + adaptation’ approach is a win-win for governments, because their engagement in climate change adaptation will also generate development benefits (Satterthwaite 2008). Improving the quality of and access to WASH facilities is a key part of poverty reduction as it creates a number of knock-on effects: better health increases productivity, which has positive effects on education and income.

On a local scale, this overlap can be characterised in urban institutional action to reduce climate change generated hazards, such as extending piped water supply, introducing better waste collection, changing the design of latrine systems to prevent them from overflowing in flood situations, and improving drainage (Satterthwaite 2008, Oats et al. 2014).

Of course this does come at a price: it is estimated to cost between US$1.05bn and US$2.65bn annually to adapt current urban water infrastructure in Africa to be more resilient to climate change (Muller 2007). But this is paid back in the long run; investing in water and sanitation projects generates at least US$4.3 for each dollar invested (Hutton 2012).

Social enterprises can also work to improve water supplies through new technologies. One example is the joint initiative of USAID’s WA-WASH programme and local organisation ANIMAS-SUTURA in Niger to endorse Aquatabs, an inexpensive water purification tablet which can purify 20 litres of water for only $0.02. This venture has been highly successful, and over 10 million tablets have already been sold (USAID).

In terms of WASH and development, ‘climate change is widely perceived as a threat rather than an opportunity’, but the threat of climate change can trigger widespread development and health service benefits (WHO 2009). It forces governments to focus on sustainability when planning sanitation facilities, and so new WASH infrastructure will be more resilient, long-lasting, and equitable.

COPing strategies

My previous blog post stressed the importance of good governance to effectively tackle climate change issues in Africa, particularly in regard to water and agriculture. Although farmers can make changes on the small-scale to maximise yields and use water sustainably, they look to governments and international bodies to pioneer and institute frameworks on a wide scale to benefit the agricultural sector. From the outcomes of COP22, it looks like the international community are playing their part.

The COP (Conference of the Parties) is the decision-making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and this international event is held annually to discuss the progress in the worldwide fight against climate change. This year’s COP22 climate talks, which concluded only a couple of weeks ago, were hosted by the Moroccan government in Marrakech.

It has been understood that water scarcity and food shortages are potentially the most severe impacts of climate change (DW 2016), and six of the ten countries most affected by climate change are in Africa (El Filali 2016). Morocco itself has already started to feel the effects of climate change on agriculture, particularly through the ever more erratic rainfall patterns. Only last year, Morocco received 42.7% less rain than the average year, leading to a 70% decrease in agricultural output. So Morocco hoped to make COP22 the ‘African COP’, putting issues pertaining to Africa’s agricultural vulnerabilities to climate change in the spotlight (Hicks 2016).

And it seems that they were successful. The Moroccan government launched the Adaptation of African Agriculture project, or the ‘Triple A’, which seeks to strengthen the agriculture sector through three main pillars: effective management of land, water, and climate risk (IPS News 2016).

How does the Triple A strive to improve water management?

It wants to create better water storage infrastructure, alongside better management of existing water sources, so that farmers can withstand the increasing occurrence of dry spells. One target could be Ghana, which currently only exploits 2% of its available surface and groundwater resources, but still suffers from crop failures when drought hits (Bird 2016). Furthermore, better water storage allows for more irrigation projects to be introduced. For example, a third of olive growers in Morocco are using far more water than necessary by practising traditional flood irrigation methods, but the NGO ICARDA (International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas) is working alongside the Moroccan government to encourage the uptake of drip irrigation which lowers water use by up to 70% (Abou-Sabaa 2016).

The Triple A also strives to increase access to farming inputs as well as improved weather forecasting for farmers – a new SMS system is being trialled in Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia which delivers field-specific weather information (Bird 2016). The aims of the Triple A will be undertaken in partnership with the FAO, and so far the scheme has been endorsed by 27 countries (AAA 2016).

COP22 was the first session where water was a key focus of the talks (Euro News 2016), proving that the world has now woken up to the importance of water issues, and is taking an international step to combat water challenges. The Moroccan Government, in collaboration with the French Government and the World Water Council, publicised their Blue Book on Water and Climate which stresses how water is the ‘first victim’ of climate change, and includes key advice from water organisations worldwide on how to best implement adaptations to climate change, such as by providing pragmatic solutions on how to build resilience through water management.

In addition, the Moroccan Government, together with the African Development Bank, introduced the Water for Africa initiative which is a specific action plan on how alliances can be made with political, financial and institutional bodies worldwide to develop water and sanitation services across Africa and counter the impacts of climate change (UN News Centre 2016).

As part of their climate change strategies submitted to the UNFCCC, all African countries included agricultural adaptations, which shows that this is an issue that is being taken seriously by African governments (Abou-Sabaa 2016), but a crucial ingredient to the successful implementation of these climate change initiatives is sufficient funding. Africa currently receives only 5% of global climate change funding even though 65% of Africa’s population will be affected (Bird 2016). The African Development Bank has stated that adapting to climate change is expected to cost between $20bn and $30bn every year until 2030 (Abou-Sabaa 2016), and so by securing more funding from better-off countries, they will be able to invest in these numerous projects. Through agreements from COP22, wealthier nations have pledged to fund climate-friendly development in poorer countries as well as contributing to adaptation measures. However it has also been highlighted that the most effective way that wealthier nations can help is by stopping fossil fuel consumption and exploiting the resources of poorer nations – a more indirect way of assisting Africa (DW 2016).

The FAO is planning to invest $1.5m to support six African small island developing states (SIDS) in making their agricultural practices more resilient to climate shocks and to improve the efficiency of farming practices. This will provide funding to train farmers on climate-smart food production, as well as the money needed to find innovative ways to increase crop yields. As SIDS nations suffer from high levels of unemployment and poverty and are heavily reliant on food imports, this investment should kill two birds with one stone by increasing food security and boosting development (Coastweek 2016).

The outcomes of COP22 are a fantastic example of how governments can work alongside NGOs – and each other – in a more equitable fight against climate change. These initiatives all sounds brilliant on paper, but only time will tell whether they lead to any real, tangible outcomes that truly benefit Africa’s water management, food security, and development.

Hungry for agricultural resilience

Food: we grow it, we eat it, we sell it, and we would not survive without it. But shockingly, one in three people in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) suffer from chronic hunger (Schlenker and Lobell 2010).

Agriculture is an integral part of every society, particularly in SSA, where it provides employment to over 60% of the population and makes huge contributions to GDP. For example, 85% of Ethiopia’s population are employed in agriculture, and it comprises more than 40% of GDP and 90% of exports (Di Falco 2014). So it’s no surprise that expansion of agriculture is deemed by development experts as a pathway to the alleviation of poverty (Challinor et al. 2007).

However, farming in SSA is mainly subsistence focused and there is practically no technology used – 89% of cereal crops in SSA are rain-fed, and so crop production is highly reliant on rainfall patterns (Di Falco 2014, Challinor et al. 2007).

This means that climate variability is closely related to the development and food security of many SSA countries (Di Falco 2014), so the effects of climate change will disrupt agricultural development and trigger food shortages – and small-scale farmers are expected to be the hardest hit (IPCC 2008).

These food shortages will extend further than national borders, as seen through the example of South Africa which already has extremely low rainfall of only 450mm per year and high evaporation rates. Climate change is expected to increase temperatures while reducing precipitation by between 2% and 8% by 2100, and South Africa is predicted to be one of the most water scarce countries by 2025. As South Africa supplies more than half of southern Africa’s staple crop maize, the exacerbated stresses on water supply will impact agriculture and food security across the whole southern African region (Benhin 2006).

Luckily, it’s not all bad news. Some regions, such as the Ethiopian highlands, are predicted to experience a lengthened growing season due to the warming temperatures and rainfall changes (Thornton et al. 2006). Plus, frost reduction in the highlands of Mt Kenya and Kilimanjaro will allow for more temperate crops to be grown such as apples, pears, barley and wheat (Parry et al. 2004).

Even where the future of food production in SSA does look bleak, this doesn’t have to be the case. Awareness of the challenge of climate change should act as an incentive for more serious investments to be made to improve agricultural productivity. Adaptation measures can be introduced, and modernisation of agricultural practices can be adopted to give farmers greater control over their yields (Schlenker and Lobell 2010).

Adaptation measures have been used traditionally by subsistence farmers to conserve water during periods of low rainfall, such as water harvesting techniques, water storage, and planting drought-resistant crops (IPCC 2008). Furthermore, farmers in South Africa have responded to the shifts in rainfall that have become shorter but more intense by planting later, and making furrows to collect rainwater near the plants, in order to take full advantage of the rainfall (Benhin 2006). It is possible that when drought becomes widespread and persistent these adaptation measures will become inadequate on the farm-scale (Challinor et al. 2007), but such traditional knowledge should be incorporated into climate change policies as these techniques are sustainable and cost-effective (IPCC 2008).

Rainwater harvesting in South Africa

If traditional adaptation techniques alone are not enough, they should be complemented by the introduction of new technologies to ensure the future of agriculture in Africa. Africa currently lags far behind the rest of the world in respect to technology adoption for agriculture, but governments can play a role in encouraging the uptake of technologies, such as high-yielding crop varieties and the application of fertilisers (Kurukulasuriya et al. 2006, Di Falco 2014). Surely African governments will be eager to explore such modernisation paths if it will prevent a drop in national GDP, and already a number of countries, including Uganda, Zambia and Kenya, have introduced modernisation of agriculture schemes in the hope of reducing poverty and vulnerability to climate change (Challinor et al. 2007).

Additionally, expanding irrigation can vastly improve the productivity of farmland, as well as increasing its resilience to precipitation changes. Non-irrigated farmland is worth $319 per hectare whereas irrigated farmland is worth $1,261 per hectare, which means that if governments invest in infrastructure for water storage, their investments will be repaid in a number of years (Kurukulasuriya et al. 2006). However, in South Africa already 50% of water resources are used to irrigate only 10% of the available farmland, so increasing irrigation in response to climate change will put pressure on the water supply for the rest of the country. Therefore if irrigation is expanded in South Africa – and other SSA countries facing similar water constraints – it is essential that water resources are managed efficiently (Benhin 2006).

Granting farmers access to weather forecasting can also assist them in adapting to climate variability, as improved weather information allows farmers to tactically plan according to the seasons, and to shift planting dates according to when rain is predicted to fall (Cooper et al. 2008, Challinor et al. 2007).

It seems ironic that Africa only contributes 3.8% of global greenhouse gas emissions, but its people will suffer the most because of their low levels of resilience to climate change (AMCOW 2012). But we can see that there is so much potential to change this in regard to agriculture, and a strong governance framework is key to ensuring that adaptation measures are effectively implemented.

Hampering Hydroelectricity?

Only 30.5% of sub-Saharan Africa has access to electricity (Cole et al. 2014). Electricity is an essential ingredient for developing an economy, but it is also important for this energy to be cheap to produce and come from an environmentally friendly, renewable source. So what energy source ticks all these boxes? Hydroelectric power!

Hydroelectric power (HEP) is generated by using turbines built into dam infrastructure to capture the kinetic energy of river flow and convert it into electrical energy. It’s a clean and affordable method of producing electricity, and its uptake and expansion would be a welcome shift in countries such as South Africa which is so reliant on coal for energy that it now has one of the highest carbon footprints worldwide (Mukheibir 2007).

HEP generation is currently concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa on the main rivers: the Nile, the Congo and the Zambezi. Many sub-Saharan African countries are highly dependent on this energy source, with some – including Mozambique, Zambia, Uganda and the DRC – deriving over 90% of their energy from HEP (Blackshear et al. 2011, Sharife 2009). HEP is a valuable tool for sustainable development as well as for alleviating poverty, and it’s estimated that Africa has only exploited 9% of its HEP potential (Cole et al. 2014).

So surely current HEP infrastructure power should be expanded – what could possibly go wrong?

Well, actually, a lot.

Hydroelectricity generation relies on a plentiful supply of water in the rivers, but climate change threatens the success of HEP schemes across Africa due to shifting rainfall patterns and rising temperatures. The increase of drought frequency and intensity due to climate change will lower water levels which will in turn reduce the capacity of hydroelectric plants.

However, these environmental considerations have not been taken into account when locating existing and planned African dams. For example, a dam is being planned on the border between Burundi, Congo and Rwanda on their common border regardless of all three countries having experienced power shortages from plummeting river levels (Cole et al. 2014).

Already, droughts in the past decade have forced power rationing in a number of sub-Sahara African countries: the Kenyan drought in 1998-2000 caused HEP production to fall by 25% (Karekezi et al 2009), lack of rainfall in 1998 in Ghana reduced hydropower production by 40%, and Tanzania had to impose electricity rationing after droughts in both 2006 and 2011 (Cole et al 2014). As climate change continues, this is only expected to worsen over time (Blackshear et al 2011).

A 10-20% decline in rainfall is predicted in some regions which will completely dry up the rivers in Botswana and Tunisia (Sharife 2009). On the Zambezi River, even though precipitation is predicted to increase during the rainy season, the dry season is expected to get even drier, resulting in the annual flow levels of Victoria Falls to decrease by 10-35%. If water levels fall by 35%, power production will drop by 21% making HEP production here uneconomic (Harrison and Whittington 2002).

The location of the Zambezi River in East Africa

Zambia is one of the most recent victims of electricity shortages. The Kariba Dam along the Zambezi River is one of the world’s largest hydroelectric dams and in the past has provided Zambia with such abundant cheap energy that as well as achieving political stability, its economy has been growing at over 5% every year through the copper mining industry (which requires vast quantities of water). However due to climate changes in the region, between 1960 and 2003 temperatures have increased by 1.3°C, rainfall has dropped by 2.3% every decade, and the rainy season has shortened (New York Times 2016). Consequently, recent droughts have led to a 25% decrease in HEP generation capacity (Reuters 2015). Due to Zambia’s extremely high reliance on the Kariba Dam for its energy requirements, power shortages are now frequent, rolling blackouts have been introduced, and copper mines are being threatened with 30% less power (Kozacek 2015). As a result, Zambia has been forced to reach out to the IMF for assistance.

The Kariba Dam

But what about the periods of increased precipitation that are predicted to occur in the wet season and in certain years on the Zambezi River? Surely this is an advantage of these environmental changes? Unfortunately not – although more rainfall can be a huge benefit by increasing the capacity of HEP generation, unexpected flooding can be destructive to hydroelectric infrastructure due to the vast quantities of sediment, vegetation, and even logs that accumulate and block the dam, decreasing its efficiency and requiring infrastructure repairs (Mukheibir 2007).

Nevertheless, the exploitation of hydroelectricity should not be ruled out as a source of electricity in Africa. If hydroelectric power is to be expanded to serve rising energy demands across the continent, it is essential that HEP generation coexists alongside other renewable energy sources, such as biomass, because diversifying the energy mix will reduce the vulnerability of economic development to hydrological changes (World Bank 2013). Furthermore, effective water management methods should be put in place at the water basins used for HEP generation to ensure that all water is used efficiently in order to maximise capacity (Yamba et al 2011).

Lastly, if the goal of expanding HEP generation is to increase the capacity of energy available for development across Africa, it is vital that this energy is equitably distributed. For example, even though Mozambique currently produces enough electricity to power the whole country, they export much of this energy, leaving only 9% of Mozambicans with access to electricity. Small scale farmers, rural communities and the poor members of the population have been excluded from the ‘luxury’ of electricity (Sharife 2009). At present, this 91% don’t have to worry about climate change; power cuts are irrelevant if you never had any electricity to begin with.